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Gun crime incident reviews as a strategy for enhancing problem solving and information 
sharing 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Over the last several decades, police departments and other criminal justice agencies have seen a 
shift toward a proactive problem-solving response to crime problems. This problem solving 
orientation has often included an emphasis on expanded partnerships across criminal justice 
agencies as well as with a variety of community stakeholders, including researchers. This 
manuscript uses the issue of gun violence as a lens through which to examine the organizational 
and inter-organizational changes necessary to apply a data-driven, proactive, and strategic 
policing-led response to gun homicides and non-fatal shootings in four Midwestern sites. Each 
site adapted a unique data collection process and incident review. The data collection, incident 
reviews, and the varying models developed across the four cities, provide a reflection on 
corresponding organizational and inter-organizational changes that illuminate the movement 
toward this proactive, data-driven, problem solving model of criminal justice. Fulfilling the 
promise of the incident reviews, however, requires internal organizational and cross-agency 
inter-organizational collaboration to align people, systems, and resources with this proactive, 
problem-solving model. Additionally, effectively implementing these organizational and inter-
organizational changes appears dependent on commitment and leadership, collaboration and 
partnerships, data quality and availability, and training and communication within and across 
organizational boundaries. 
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Gun crime incidents reviews as a strategy for enhancing problem solving and information 
sharing 
 
Over the last several decades, police departments and other criminal justice agencies have 
seen a shift toward a proactive problem-solving response to crime problems. This problem 
solving orientation has often included an emphasis on expanded partnerships across criminal 
justice agencies as well as with a variety of community stakeholders, including researchers 
(Roehl et al. 2008).  Indeed, several scholars witnessing these trends labeled this the ‘new 
criminal justice’ and have argued that the criminal justice system’s response to crime is no 
longer a simple reactive and linear process of case processing from police to courts to corrections 
(Klofas, Hipple, and McGarrell 2010). Rather, the police are increasingly working with 
coalitions of agencies and organizations that pool their powers to serve crime reduction goals, 
are concentrating on fundamentally local problems and issues, and are increasingly data-driven 
and research based. And, for many reasons, local law enforcement most often must be the leaders 
in strategic responses to crime problems. 
  Although these shifts are not uniform across cities or criminal justice agencies, there are 
abundant signs of an increasing emphasis on goals and methods that emphasize a more proactive 
and problem solving mission. These include studies of the impact of problem solving initiatives 
focused on policing (e.g., Braga and Weisburd 2010), community supervision (e.g., Hawken and 
Kleiman 2009), and specialized courts (e.g., Mitchell et al. 2012b, Sevigny, Fuleihan, and Ferdik 
2013). And, while there is great variation, there is evidence that proactive initiatives can reduce 
crime and criminal involvement. Traditionally, this research has focused on the outcomes of 
crime interventions, and researchers have yet to describe in detail the organizational processes 
needed to adopt these models, particularly using an organizational theory lens. This paper seeks 
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to contribute to our knowledge about the efficacy of the problem solving model in policing by 
examining one type of process focused on one specific problem in four distinct jurisdictions.  
Specifically, this manuscript uses the issue of gun violence as a lens through which to 
examine the organizational and inter-organizational changes necessary to apply a data-driven, 
proactive, and strategic policing-led response to gun homicides (GH) and non-fatal shootings 
(NFS). This multi-jurisdictional case study (Creswell 2012) focuses on an innovative process for 
studying gun violence across four cities with medium to high levels of gun violence. 
Specifically, the manuscript will describe the innovative implementation of crime incident 
reviews (Klofas et al. 2006) spearheaded by local police departments to address gun-related 
crime. Data come from four cities: Detroit, Indianapolis, Milwaukee, and St. Louis. Although the 
implementation goals were the same, each site adapted a unique data collection process and 
incident review process (three sites). The data collection, incident reviews, and the varying 
models developed across the four cities, provide a reflection on corresponding organizational and 
inter-organizational changes that illuminate the movement toward this proactive, data-driven, 
problem solving model of criminal justice.  
Background and related research 
Problem solving movement 
 In the late 1970s, Herman Goldstein called for a fundamental shift in how the police think 
about their response to crime (Goldstein 1990, 1979). Rather than general strategies (e.g., 
randomized patrol) and a focus on responding to crime incidents (e.g., enhanced response times, 
clearance rates), Goldstein argued that the police needed to think about addressing specific 
categories of problems. Building on research demonstrating recurring patterns of different crime 
types (e.g., business burglaries during nighttime in contrast to daytime burglaries of residences; 
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intimate partner violence in contrast to assaults in bars and taverns), the problem solving model 
emphasized that crime prevention and control would be advanced much more effectively by 
improving responses to problem types as opposed to improved processing of individual cases. 
With the introduction of tools like the SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment) 
Model (Eck and Spelman 1987), individual police officers were empowered to problem solve on 
their own. Using four steps, the SARA model helped guide police to identify problems, 
determine their underlying causes, and implement and assess evidence-based responses to those 
problems.  
It appears that research on the problem solving model itself has largely occurred in the 
context of policing. And, although research demonstrates promise across the problem solving 
initiatives (Braga 2008, Braga and Weisburd 2010, Hawken and Kleiman 2009, Henry and 
Kralstein 2011, Mitchell et al. 2012a, Sevigny, Fuleihan, and Ferdik 2013), at least in the context 
of policing there is also evidence that problem solving models like the SARA model are not 
always implemented as intended. For example, Cordner and Biebel (2005) studied problem 
solving in the San Diego Police Department, considered leaders in problem solving policing, and 
found a significant gap between the ‘Goldstein’ model and the actual practice of problem solving 
(see also Braga and Weisburd 2006, Capowich and Roehl 1994, Tilley 1999). Specifically, there 
was a tendency to focus on individual problems (a problem person or a problem place) as 
opposed to groupings of problem types spanning blocks, neighborhoods, or a police beat. They 
also found that the analysis of the problem and impact assessment was often very limited. And, 
despite having an established crime analysis unit, there appeared to be limited involvement of 
crime analysts in the problem solving efforts. There was also tendency to focus on drug and 
disorder problems to the exclusion of problems associated with property and violent crimes. That 
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is, officers believed problem solving policing was most effective when applied to less serious or 
“soft” crimes such as drug and disorder problems and was not really applicable to all crimes, 
especially serious crime. Cordner and Biebel (2005) found a reasonably high level of support for 
problem solving but there was variation among officers consistent with other research that has 
found that problem solving may be limited to particular officers or units (Cordner and Biebel 
2005, Skogan et al. 1999, Toch and Grant 1991).   
In the context of the present research on gun crime, the problem solving efforts move 
beyond individual officers to multiple units within the police department working in partnership 
with other criminal justice agencies. Additionally, the limitations of traditional police data 
sources for studying gun crime requires that the problem solving analysis consider innovative 
approaches to analyzing the gun crime problem. Absent such innovation and organizational 
adaptations, problem analysis will be based on limited and selective incidents (e.g., homicides) 
and on limited information about the people, groups, places, and contexts of the incidents. 
Organizational and Inter-organizational Dimensions 
Problem solving approaches in policing, prosecution, judicial and corrections contexts include 
internal organizational changes as well as collaboration across organizations. At the 
organizational level, the police have traditionally responded to calls for service, investigated 
alleged crimes, and made arrests tied to specific incidents. Prosecutors screen arrests and 
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute. The courtroom workgroup 
(prosecution, defense, judges and court staff) handles specific cases to determine guilt or 
innocence and allocate sentences. Corrections staff then handle the individual offender according 
to the terms of his or her sentence (community sanctions, supervision, and/or incarceration). As 
such, criminal justice personnel who have traditionally worked as part of ‘people processing’ 
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organizations (Hasenfeld 1972, Hasenfeld and Cheung 1985) responding to specific incidents, 
cases, and defendants, are now being asked to address persistent problems. This requires changes 
in orientation, work processes, communication patterns, and measures of organizational success.  
As with all public bureaucracies, criminal justice agencies tend to resist change (Allen 
2002, Miller, Ohlin, and Coates 1977) and thus the move toward a problem solving model is not 
automatic and implementation is likely to be a challenge (Skogan and Hartnett 1997).  As 
mentioned earlier, despite a long term commitment to problem solving including training, 
organizational incentives, a robust crime analysis unit, and a data system for documenting 
problem solving activities, San Diego is an example of the difficulty of implementing a different 
way of doing business (Cordner and Biebel 2005) (see also Skogan et al. 1999, Toch and Grant 
1991).1 This organizational resistance is compounded by the reality that all the affected 
organizations retain responsibility to their own day to day missions, to respond to calls from the 
public, and to process individual cases.  
Incident Reviews 
Systematic incident reviews, typically focused on homicides, have developed as an approach to 
fill the gap in traditional information systems. Gun crime incident reviews build upon processes 
developed in public health. Specifically, public health researchers have utilized systematic 
mortality incident reviews to advance knowledge and improve practice in relation to fetal, infant, 
child, and maternal deaths (Hutchins, Grason, and Handler 2004). The public health reviews 
were developed to address limitations in the scope and timeliness of existing data systems. The 
reviews seek ‘to improve the understanding of personal, social, and community as well as 
                                                 
1 Braga and Weisburd (2006) offer the interesting observation that even with limited analysis there is evidence of 
problem solving efforts having a positive effect on crime and public safety. 
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medical factors associated with adverse reproductive and infant health outcomes at the local 
level’ (Hutchins, Grason, and Handler 2004, 259). 
Although problem solving generally, and incident reviews as an analytical component of 
problem solving, can logically occur within single organizations, experience suggests these 
initiatives often occur in an inter-organizational context (Azrael, Braga, and O'Brien 2013, Braga 
et al. 2001, Klofas et al. 2006).  Typically, incident reviews are part of expanded inter-
organizational linkages as the goal is to bring multiple perspectives and multiple sources of 
information to the review. With respect to policing, problem solving efforts typically call for 
establishing partnerships with local residents and neighborhood associations, business owners, 
code enforcement, utilities, and social services. Ideally, incident reviews include a variety of 
agency stakeholders that may have ‘touched’ the individuals (suspects, victims) and the groups 
or networks connected to the incident, the location of the incident, or have more general insight 
into the nature of the problem. Thus, successfully implementing crime incident reviews involves 
securing the support and cooperation of multiple units within and across multiple agencies. 
Those involved believe these partnerships provide additional sources of information (e.g., 
probationer and parolee information) as well as additional resources for addressing recurring 
problems (e.g., focused prosecution, code enforcement, Crime Prevention Through 
Environmental Design [CPTED] strategies).  Milwaukee   
 The emphasis on inter-agency collaboration to support both problem solving and crime 
incident reviews suggests an increased ‘coupling’ of what is typically seen as a loosely coupled 
system (or non-system) (Duffee 1980, Wright 1981). That is, rather than simply moving cases 
along the various components of the criminal justice system, problem solving and crime incident 
reviews attempt to foster information sharing about recurring problems across multiple agencies 
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and stakeholders. Ideally, the information sharing leads to deeper understanding of the drivers of 
the crime problem and improved responses in terms of crime prevention and public safety. 
 The Boston Gun Project provides the first documented example of systematic incident 
reviews used as a key analytic process in criminology (Braga et al. 2001). Also referred to as 
Boston Ceasefire, this multi-agency initiative partnered criminal justice personnel with a 
research team that followed a problem solving model that included systematic incident reviews 
of gun homicides involving youths. The incident reviews led to new insights about the nature of 
youth gun violence in Boston. Specifically, gun crime was highly concentrated among a small 
proportion of the youth population, victims and suspects overlapped across a number of 
dimensions, and youths involved in violent street groups were at considerably heightened risk for 
offending and victimization (Braga et al. 2001). These characteristics became the emphasis of 
the Boston Ceasefire focused deterrence intervention. 
The success of Boston Ceasefire led to the adoption of systematic incident reviews in a 
series of similar problem solving violence prevention and control initiatives including the 
Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI) (Roehl et al. 2008) and Project 
Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) (Klofas et al. 2006). The incident reviews sought to combine street 
level intelligence from a variety of criminal justice sources to increase the understanding of the 
nature of gun crime and to inform local prevention and control strategies.  That way, criminal 
justice officials could strategically focus limited resources for maximum effectiveness. 
Secondary benefits could include information to support investigations and clear cases and to 
identify system gaps or failures.  
It is difficult, however, to analyze the impact of incident reviews because they are 
typically associated with specific interventions such as Boston Ceasefire, SACSI, or PSN (e.g., 
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Braga et al. 2001, Klofas et al. 2006, McGarrell et al. 2010, McGarrell et al. 2006). An 
exception, however, is the evaluation of the Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission (Azrael, 
Braga, and O'Brien 2013). For purposes of the evaluation, the incident reviews focused on 
particular police districts (treatment sites) and found reductions in gun crime. Specifically, the 
treatment police districts observed over a 50 percent reduction in homicides that was statistically 
significant when compared to a nine percent reduction in the control districts (Azrael, Braga, and 
O'Brien 2013). Additionally, over a two and one-half year period, the Milwaukee Homicide 
Review Commission developed over 100 recommendations aimed at reducing homicides. These 
recommendations ranged from single agency recommendations such as recommending the police 
department increase patrols to problem taverns (reviews indicated 10 percent of homicides 
occurred in or directly outside a tavern) to co-locating Wisconsin Department of Corrections 
agents in the police district stations to allow for closer client supervision and improved police-
agent collaboration. The Governor’s Office funded this recommendation (O'Brien, Woods, and 
Cisler 2007). 
Gun violence 
In the instance of addressing gun crime, the lack of readily available data sources on gun 
crime incidents severely limits the ability of research to contribute to the understanding of gun 
violence and the development of evidence-based strategies for reducing gun violence.  In 2005, 
the National Research Council’s Committee on Law and Justice noted that information on gun-
related violence was far too limited and fragmented to provide “accurate, complete, timely, and 
detailed data on the incidence and characteristics of gun-related violence” (2005, 20).  
Historically, police incident data in the form of the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system 
have provided descriptive data on gun crime limited largely to homicides. The Supplemental 
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Homicide Reporting (SHR) system provides more details on homicides and both the SHRs and 
National Incident Based Reporting Systems (NIBRS) allow for the isolation of incidents 
involving guns. However, there is a considerable time delay before SHRs are available for 
analyses and NIBRS systems remain the exception rather than the rule for most jurisdictions in 
the United States as roughly one-third of law enforcement agencies participating in UCR 
reported via NIBRS in 2013 (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2015a). Even when focused on 
homicides in jurisdictions covered by SHR and NIBRS systems, researchers have questioned the 
reliability and validity of gun crime data elements such as victim-offender relationships and 
incident characteristics like gang involvement or intimate partner violence (e.g., Braga et al. 
1999, Loftin 1986, Loftin et al. 2015, Riedel 1990, Williams and Flewelling 1987, Maxfield 
1989).  The additional limitation of the SHR’s is the absence of data to study NFS. 
The current study focuses on data collection and problem solving efforts to better address 
gun violence through the use of systematic crime incident reviews. The study benefits by 
examining gun violence data collection and incident reviews efforts across four jurisdictions.  
Consequently, it provides the opportunity to examine similarities and differences across four 
jurisdictions, trade-offs associated with varying approaches to the incident reviews and their 
implementation, and consideration of the organizational and inter-organizational dimensions of 
systematic incident reviews as a component of problem solving. 
The Project 
 
In 2014, the authors embarked on a 30-month project funded by the National Institute of 
Justice. The overarching goals of this project included both improvements in gun violence 
information systems as well as advancing basic knowledge about gun violence. Specific goals 
included: increasing understanding of the spatial and network dimensions of gun violence; 
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creating a better understanding of NFS and how they relate to GH; and, improving data systems 
on gun violence. The research team proposed a ‘ground-up’ approach, working with four 
midwestern police departments to combine GH and NFS incidents into common databases and to 
supplement incident reports through a variety of data sources, with the main supplemental 
mechanism being crime incident reviews (Klofas et al. 2006). The initial project included 
Detroit, Indianapolis, and Milwaukee. St. Louis was added as the fourth site mid-way through 
the project and, while gun crime data collection was a priority in St. Louis, implementing crime 
incident reviews was not due to the shortened project time frame. 
Table 1 displays the violent crime and homicide rates for the four study sites. Detroit and 
St. Louis are similar in their crime rates and are consistently ranked among the cities with the 
highest violent crime and homicide rates in the United States. Indianapolis and Milwaukee 
experience more moderate rates of violent crime, though both cities have rates over three times 
the national average for metropolitan jurisdictions.   
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Each site had a local research partner who was charged with data collection and 
coordinating and implementing crime incident reviews to fit the local context. The crime incident 
review process was rooted in the Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission process (O'Brien, 
Woods, and Cisler 2007). And, as expected, each site had its own specific data collection and 
review methodology based on existing data systems and the wants and needs of the local police 
organization. The overarching research question of this study is to what extent can gun crime 
incident reviews contribute to our understanding of gun crime and contribute to problem solving 
prevention initiatives?  With this broad question in mind, the research questions informing the 
current analysis include: 
 13 
 
RQ1: How have incident reviews developed in these jurisdictions? 
RQ2: What are the similarities and differences across the three jurisdictions in the 
incident reviews? 
 
RQ3: What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of these approaches to the  
 incident reviews? 
 
RQ4: What are the benefits and the challenges of the incident reviews? 
RQ5: What are the implications for organizational and inter-organizational and 
implementation dimensions necessary for the effective use of gun crime incident 
reviews? 
 
Findings 
 
All four sites have similar, long histories of federally supported multi-agency crime 
reduction efforts including SACSI, PSN, and the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative (CAGI). 
Milwaukee has been conducting homicide reviews since 2005. Indianapolis conducted incident 
reviews during the SACSI project but had since discontinued the reviews. Indianapolis re-
instituted crime incident reviews in late 2012, around the same time that Detroit embarked on 
reviews. The incident reviews were an important component for the current project. Although St. 
Louis does not conduct homicide or NFS reviews specifically, there is a long history of 
CompStat within the St. Louis Police Department. Consequently, St. Louis offers a valuable 
contrast to the other three cities and is likely representative of major city police departments that 
has not yet begun a formal process for homicide or NFS incident reviews. 
Incident review development  
In three sites, the development of incident reviews coincided with data collection efforts. 
As expected, the police departments at each site collected and maintained robust data pertaining 
to GH and they were able to extract homicide information easily to provide to the researchers. 
These data included victim and offender information, and case details such as location and 
 14 
 
motive. In contrast, with the exception of Milwaukee, none of the sites could provide accurate 
data on NFS. Therefore, the priority became establishing a system for collecting data on NFS if 
there was not one. The incident review process would be part of this; however, due to the volume 
of NFS at each site, NFS reviews would serve to supplement a larger NFS data collection 
method. 
Beginning in late November 2013, the ‘Detroit Ceasefire’ team began holding weekly 
incident reviews covering all gun crime incidents in two police precincts that had among the 
highest levels of gun crime in the city. The gun crime incident reviews were developed as part of 
a gun violence prevention initiative modeled on the problem solving component of Boston 
Ceasefire. The Detroit Ceasefire team agreed to follow this model and to use systematic incident 
reviews of gun crime incidents as the key analytical component of its ongoing problem solving 
intended to identify the drivers of gun crime violence in the 5th and 9th Precincts. As was the 
case in Milwaukee, as a National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) jurisdiction2, 
Detroit was able to query the DPD records management system to identify aggravated assaults 
with a gun involving an injury. However, in order to meet the goals of timely identification of all 
NFS, it was necessary for a member of the research team to manually read aggravated assaults, 
armed robberies, carjackings and other firearms-involved incidents in order to identify and 
accurately count NFS in a real-time environment.   
Indianapolis reinstituted incident reviews in 2012 after years without them. Recognizing 
that NFS were approximately four times as common as GH, and noting the limited information 
available about NFS, a small multi-agency working group decided to attempt NFS incident 
reviews after a change in leadership. The reviews would supplement a citywide NFS data 
                                                 
2 As of 2013, Detroit and Milwaukee were NIBRS jurisdictions. Indianapolis and St. Louis were not  
(Federal Bureau of Investigation 2015a). 
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collection effort and review incidents would be a selection of NFS occurring in one zip code. 
This zip code was selected based on an analysis of historical criminal homicide data and the 
increased risk for young black males living in this geographic area to become a homicide victim. 
While there were no NFS data to supplement the homicide data at that time it was reasonable to 
assume that NFS would follow the same geographic and victim patterns. 
Indianapolis does not proactively search police incident records management systems for 
NFS incidents. Instead, the research team is notified about NFS incidents via an internal police 
document that is completed by Aggravated Assault and Homicide detectives, usually within 24 
hours of a homicide or NFS. This internal document is the beginning point for data collection on 
all NFS. After receiving the internal document, the research team manually verifies all NFS like 
the other sites using available records management systems. 
Milwaukee developed a multi-agency homicide review process in 2005, and PSN grant 
funds supported the first Milwaukee homicide reviews (http://city.milwaukee.gov/hrc). Initially 
the homicide reviews occurred in three of the seven police districts and then expanded citywide 
in 2008. In an effort to learn more about firearm violence, NFS associated with homicides were 
incorporated into the reviews in 2006. Milwaukee’s commitment to NFS reviews was an 
extension of their long, uninterrupted commitment to homicide incident reviews. Milwaukee is 
similar to Detroit in that the research team proactively searches the police incident report records 
management system for NFS. In addition to verifying each incident, the research team also 
searches police calls for service data looking for incidents they might have missed. 
This project allowed for some fine-tuning of the review process at each site. In Detroit, 
observations that many homicide and non-fatal shooting suspects and victims had prior carrying 
a concealed weapon (CCW) charges led to an expanded gun crime definition to include CCW 
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arrests. Likewise, Indianapolis adjusted its NFS review case selection process several times since 
this project started. Each change was made to address ‘missed’ cases, which are cases 
participants felt were not being reviewed but should be.  
And, most recently, Milwaukee, the site with crime incident reviews in place the longest, 
has changed the NFS reviews to focus on the most frequent perpetrators of gun violence and 
their associates. This change in case selection was intended not only to focus on the individuals 
most likely to be involved in gun violence but to also improve information sharing and 
intelligence on these individuals.  Additionally, participation was expanded to include additional 
federal criminal justice partners (ATF, FBI). 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Incident review structure 
All four sites captured homicide and NFS data citywide but there were differences in the types of 
reviews conducted and how the reviews were structured (see Table 2). Milwaukee conducts both 
monthly homicide reviews focused on city-wide incidents and bi-weekly NFS reviews focused 
on a sample of NFS based on the meeting location (e.g. a meeting at the 3rd District police station 
focused on a sample NFS occurring in the 3rd district). NFS cases have been selected by the 
districts, investigation bureau, or by MHRC staff; criteria have varied from hotspots to gang-
related to drug-related to robberies, the focus is driven by the stakeholders. 
Indianapolis limited the focus of its monthly reviews to NFS using a triage approach to 
focus only on criminal NFS (accidental and self-inflicted NFS were excluded). In contrast to 
Milwaukee and Indianapolis, Detroit conducts weekly reviews focusing on all gun crimes in two 
contiguous police precincts. Gun crimes were defined to include homicides, non-fatal shootings, 
aggravated assaults with a firearm (i.e., shootings that did not result in a victim being struck; 
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brandishing), armed robberies, and carjackings, and as noted earlier, CCW arrests. In essence, 
and consistent with the variation in geographic and crime focus, Detroit conducted weekly 
reviews with significantly more incidents while both Indianapolis and Milwaukee focused on a 
smaller number of incidents during monthly NFS reviews (Indianapolis), monthly homicide 
reviews, and bi-weekly NFS reviews (Milwaukee).   
The distinctions also related to the preparation for the reviews. Given the bi-weekly or 
monthly frequency, Indianapolis and Milwaukee distributed case lists approximately one week 
before the review and prepared PowerPoint summaries to guide the review meeting. In Detroit, 
given the weekly frequency, the research team prepared case summaries and distributed them 
two days before the review. In Milwaukee and Indianapolis, police department officials provided 
case summaries and then the discussion was guided by the research team. In Detroit, officials 
from the police department guided the review discussions. 
The reviews in the three sites were structured quite similarly in terms of participation 
And, while exact review attendees varied from meeting to meeting, by crime review type (GH or 
NFS), and by site, there were common partnerships represented across the three sites. Table 3 
displays the partners who regularly and occasionally participated in reviews at each site. All 
three sites’ reviews included representation of federal, state and local partners. Although there 
were slight differences across the three sites, for example, Detroit and Milwaukee had more 
participation from federal law enforcement agencies, these variations tended to reflect 
differences in the structure of each organization. Occasional participation by some partners 
reflected both the cases being reviewed as well as resource availability. As expected, police 
department representation was significant at all sites. Table 3 also includes a more detailed list of 
police department attendees. All three sites included regular involvement from street level 
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officers and at least occasional involvement among command staff, homicide and/or major 
crimes investigators. Detroit and Indianapolis included special units such as gang and 
intelligence with Indianapolis also including the juvenile unit. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
All three sites included local prosecutors as well as combinations of probation and parole, 
community corrections, and the Department of Corrections. Some of the local level variations 
included Detroit incorporating the state police, Indianapolis incorporating the crime lab, 
Milwaukee and Indianapolis occasionally incorporating jail staff, and both Indianapolis and 
Milwaukee including personnel from fusion intelligence centers. Whereas Indianapolis included 
the juvenile unit from the lead police department (IMPD), both Detroit and Indianapolis included 
school police. 
All three sites included research teams in the incident reviews. The teams consisted of a 
lead researcher affiliated with a local university and at least one research assistant. As noted 
earlier, the research team did considerable preparation for the reviews at each site. The research 
team also provided input and facilitated discussion as well as captured the data generated in the 
reviews. Follow-up questions were tailored to each site and their operational and data collection 
needs. For instance, Detroit had a specific interest in group and gang activity as it related to their 
gun crime incidents. Indianapolis tended to focus on repeat individuals (i.e., involved in multiple 
NFS in any role) and locations. Milwaukee often posed the question of whether anything could 
have been done to prevent the incident from occurring. Additionally, Detroit and Milwaukee 
included civilian project coordinators and outreach workers. In the case of Detroit, these were 
individuals responsible for Detroit Ceasefire whereas in Milwaukee these were individuals who 
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were part of the Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission and employed by the Milwaukee 
Health Department, Office of Violence Prevention. 
Benefits 
 As expected, there are advantages and disadvantages to the way in which each site 
conducted their reviews (see Table 4). As each site tailored their reviews to their local context, 
they had to take into consideration issues related to time sensitivity (i.e., operational and tactical 
responses), resource constraints (i.e., human and data), amount and detail of information related 
to gun crime (i.e., cross-district, cross-case). Thus, Indianapolis and Milwaukee prioritized 
strategic intelligence through less frequent but more comprehensive reviews of a smaller 
universe of incidents. Detroit prioritized tactical intelligence to support timely prevention actions 
through weekly reviews of a larger volume of incidents. The tradeoff for Detroit was often very 
limited information about incidents whereas the tradeoff for Indianapolis and Milwaukee was the 
potential loss of opportunity to intervene for prevention purposes. As time passed, each site 
adjusted its review structure as needed but involving tradeoffs in the relative advantages and 
disadvantages summarized in Table 4. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
The observed benefits of the incident reviews include those both internal and external to 
the police department. However, generally speaking, a benefit that affected the police department 
also carried external benefits to other participating agencies. For example, the reviews 
encouraged a significant change in communication and information sharing at all levels across 
all agencies. That is, all sites saw communication and information sharing benefits both intra- 
and inter-agency. And, in this context, ‘information’ could mean a wide variety of things. 
Certainly, information could include official data coming from agency records management 
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systems. At the same time, information could also be lead information, information from a field 
notebook, or acquired from a citizen, unofficial in nature, and not recorded in any formal records 
management system. 
The very nature of the multi-unit (i.e., within the police department) and multi-agency 
partnerships increased information sharing. The reviews served as a forum where units and 
officers who did not usually work side by side or regularly interact could share information about 
the gun crime incidents. The review meetings created the same opportunity for agencies across 
the state, local, and federal criminal justice system to share information with the local police 
department and other agencies. Agencies such as probation and parole could share information 
about the involvement of their clients and add to gang information from intelligence gathered in 
jails and prisons. State and federal prosecutors could glean information about cases they may 
decide warrant increased attention and consider the benefits of state versus federal prosecution. 
They could also inform law enforcement partners about information they need to successfully 
prosecute cases. And, communication that occurred outside the reviews increased as well as a 
result of the relationships established through the review process. 
Given the difficulty in collecting data specifically relating to NFS, the review process 
served as a good supplement to the data collection processes at all sites even though reviewing 
every gun crime incident or even just NFS in every city proved impossible. The crime incident 
reviews increased the strategic and tactical understanding of gun violence at each site. For 
example, Detroit’s reviews revealed that the proportion of gun violence attributable to violent 
street group members was smaller than observed in other cities that have deployed the Ceasefire 
strategy. In all three cities, the reviews have indicated that individuals involved in prior NFS as 
suspects, victims, and witnesses appear to be at high risk for future involvement in NFS and GH. 
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Creating a strategic understanding of gun violence helped inform tactical operations and 
resource deployment across sites. Review meetings often revealed immediate situations that 
could have resulted in further gun violence absent timely intervention by one of the participants 
such as retaliatory shootings against victims or witnesses. The reviews helped each site collect 
information specific to the local context and interest of the stakeholders (i.e., group and gang 
involvement, repeat individuals, prevention). Related, the incident reviews helped create a better 
understanding of the drivers of gun violence. This, in turn, created an environment that built 
shared commitment to addressing gun violence. While more difficult to quantify, accountability, 
coordination of efforts, cooperation, and service delivery all improved at the agency level. And, 
although cause and effect is difficult to disentangle, the simple act of meeting on a regular basis 
to review specific cases appeared to facilitate a shared commitment to addressing the lethal 
carnage discussed at each meeting. 
Challenges 
All four sites had long histories of actively working with researchers. As a result of this project, 
systematic gun crime data collection including NFS is occurring in all four sites and three of the 
four sites are conducting incident reviews. Collecting data and conducting reviews presented 
challenges, sometimes different, across the sites. Yet, while often time consuming, these 
challenges did not prove insurmountable for any of the sites and generally improved over time. 
Challenges to conducting gun crime incident reviews fell into three broad categories: people, 
systems, and resources.  
People 
Garnering support across multiple agencies to participate in the review process can be difficult. 
Commitment to the review process at the executive level was paramount not just for participation 
 22 
 
but for the required access to collect data and prepare for meetings. Concerns about resources, 
time commitment, and value of the reviews were constant for every agency. All sites reported an 
ebb and flow to the support for the review process and various challenges along the way related 
to gaining and maintaining support.  
Engaging the right people to attend review meetings and bring available data were 
consistent challenges across sites. This was especially important as it related to the sharing of 
agency street-level information at meetings, that is, information not available in formal records 
management systems. And, as documented, the incident review process required heavy 
participation from law enforcement (Table 3). Often this required relying on specific officers 
(investigators, intelligence officers, etc.) to bring their knowledge and understanding of the 
individuals involved in the gun violence and the local context to the meetings. Meetings where 
‘key’ individuals were not present often limited information sharing. Not having the right people 
at the meetings to respond to questions or act on the information presented often created 
frustration among partners because a primary goal of the meetings was to foster and identify 
opportunities for agency level action. For example, shared information about a problem house 
where the landlord seems unaware of the ongoing issues might create an opportunity for an 
invitation to landlord training or a mailed letter advising the landlord of the multiple police runs 
to the location. Similarly, information about an ongoing dispute involving dangerous individuals 
provides an opportunity for violence prevention but only if acted upon.  
While staff turnover is quite common in police departments, it was exasperated by budget 
challenges, particularly in light of recent economic decline, and upper level staffing changes at 
all sites. Changes in administrations can both help and hurt project momentum. Staff changes 
resulted in frequent turnover among review meetings. Turnover also reduced the institutional 
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knowledge of the process and, in some cases, lead to a decline in buy-in among key partners. The 
review staff repeatedly communicated the importance and value of the review process. Staff 
turnover at the ground level also made it more difficult to acquire street-level intelligence for the 
incident reviews. At the same time, there were instances of staff turnover that resulted in 
renewed commitment and enthusiasm for the review process. 
And intertwined within all the people challenges is the issue of trust and personnel 
turnover created related challenges. As information sharing is the crux of the incident review 
meeting, participants must trust the others in the room in order to share information they would 
not normally share outside their own office workplace with people they would not normally 
share. Revealing details that are relevant to the review process but could also compromise a 
detective’s case requires a significant amount of trust. Indeed, a ‘visitor’ to an incident review 
meeting could change the meeting dynamics enough to affect information sharing and effectively 
silence some participants. New participants may want to ‘sit back and watch’ for a few meetings 
before sharing information. Simple awareness of potential trust issues (see, for example, Rojek, 
Smith, and Alpert 2012, Rojek, Martin, and Alpert 2015, Braga and Hinkle 2010) as well as 
careful selection (or uninviting) of meeting participants is essential. 
Systems 
The review process was dependent on the access to data. Because the existing records systems at 
all four sites did not readily allow for extraction of NFS data and other non-GH crime, each had 
to create a mechanism to manually do this. Indeed, data collection of NFS proved to be equally 
challenging across all sites. As experience will support, figuring out how to collect accurate data 
that are not readily available electronically involves both art and science and each site 
accomplished this differently. Police departments are still the gatekeepers to the most 
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informative data and each one is different. For this project, researchers needed access to more 
than just official records. And, it took time to get access, even with long time existing 
relationships in place. Each site had a research team, that is, not a single researcher, which 
usually meant records access was needed for more than one person. Background checks and in-
depth screening were common and took time and resources.  
Initially, the incident review process at each location led to frequent requests for ‘new’ 
information. For instance, discussions about an individual’s criminal history might lead to a 
request for probation or parole status or perhaps incarceration history. These requests for 
additional information resulted in the identification of information gaps. In one site, the gang unit 
had been inactive for a period and gang intelligence was stored in paper format only. In another 
site, the criminal history database that the city had used for over 15 years was replaced by a new 
program that did not afford the same information in the same way. Data validity and reliability 
were questionable as the bugs were still being worked out in the new system. 
And, in some cases, the data systems did not support questions that were being asked. For 
example, information about gang involvement or ‘gang related’ crime has proven difficult to 
capture systematically and reliably across the sites. Information on disputes, which drive a lot of 
the gun violence (Wilson, MacDonald, and Tita 2010), is also hard to cull from police records 
management systems. Repeat individuals at different incidents, especially when not the victim or 
suspect, was important to review attendees but difficult to document outside of the reviews. 
Related, sites encountered unexpected legal obstacles relating to the discussion and use of 
criminal history data for both adults and juveniles. In one case, it took about six months and a 
series of meetings to obtain formal permission to access and discuss records. In another site, the 
research team worked with team members to find a suitable substitution using police records 
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management systems while working towards formal approval of state criminal history records. 
Finally, efforts are being made to increasingly utilize technologies such as National Integrated 
Ballistics Information Network (NIBIN) data and ShotSpotter data. However, in several sites, 
NIBIN is primarily used for forensics evidence as opposed to timely intelligence and ShotSpotter 
data are new or not available and therefore neither has enhanced the information sharing in the 
incident reviews. 
Resources 
Similar to the experience of police departments adopting Community-Oriented and Problem-
Solving Policing (Greene 2004), attendees regularly had to balance every day demands like case 
investigations, court appearances, supervising clients, etc. with the time commitment of 
preparing for the reviews, attending the reviews, and acting upon the reviews. Police departments 
and partnering agencies considering the costs and benefits of implementing reviews need to 
consider the resource demands. 
The time to prepare for reviews varied across sites. Pre-meeting communications can be 
difficult given the number and variety of people involved and work schedules. As described 
above, all of three of the cities participating in the reviews benefited from the participation of 
research partners who helped prepare information for the reviews. Absent such research partners, 
crime analysts could play this role, although the neutrality afforded by the researcher would be 
lost. Some sites used PowerPoint presentations to help guide the meetings and discussion which 
required considerable time to prepare. Gathering, analyzing, and summarizing the information 
from reviews similarly involved an expenditure of human resources. 
Finally, if the reviews are executed as they are intended, more often than not, they create 
more work for individuals and agencies through case follow-up and operationalization on 
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information presented. Indeed, one of the observations across the three cities was that the 
perceived value of the reviews was often connected to the actionable intelligence generated 
therein. One telling example involved an automated teller machine (ATM) location that 
generated regular robberies, some of which included shootings. This pattern of offenses revealed 
in the reviews led to a lieutenant working with the bank that owned the ATM to limit the hours 
of operation with the goal of eliminating an apparent ‘crime attractor’ during high risk periods. 
Although in the long-term this likely reduced calls for police service, in the short-term this 
required an additional set of responsibilities for this particular lieutenant. All of these activities 
(preparation, review, post-review actions), in turn, place pressure on people and systems in what 
are typically resource constrained environments. 
Discussion 
The incident reviews implemented in three of the study sites represented an innovative analytical 
approach to support problem solving efforts intended to address the significant issue of gun 
violence. This study of the incident review process suggested that reviews represent a 
supplemental source of information to the picture of gun crime captured in police records 
management systems. Incident reviews have the potential of tapping into street level intelligence 
existing within the police department as well as with other partnering organizations. This can 
increase the strategic understanding of gun violence, for example to what extent is gun violence 
being driven by gangs, disputes, intimate partner violence, drug markets, repeat locations, felons 
in possession of a firearm, or other factors? Correspondingly, incident reviews can increase the 
tactical understanding of current factors that may be driving violence such as active disputes 
among known groups; active chronic violent offenders; or incidents likely to generate retaliatory 
violence.    
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 Achieving the promise of problem solving to address gun violence generally, or the goals 
of the incident reviews specifically, requires changes at the organizational and inter-
organizational levels. Indeed, increased “coupling” (Duffee 1980, Wright 1981) within and 
across organizations appears to be an important element of problem solving and incident 
reviews. This is reflected in the findings of the present study. In all three jurisdictions, the 
reviews brought together actors within the police department from various units and levels of the 
organization. Likewise, in all three sites the reviews involved collaboration, including police 
departments, state and/or federal law enforcement, prosecutors, corrections agencies, and other 
stakeholders. Rather than collaborating simply through the processing of cases, the reviews 
involved a common focus on problems, in this case gun crime.    
The current study suggests that, similar to other criminal justice innovations (Feeley 
1983, Rosenbaum 1986, Skogan and Hartnett 1997, Skogan et al. 1999), implementing crime 
incident reviews is difficult. Research indicates there are key dimensions that need to be present 
in order for successful implementation to occur (McGarrell and Hipple 2014) and this is likely to 
be the case for successful implementation of incident reviews. These dimensions include 
commitment and leadership, partnerships, data availability and sharing, and communication and 
training. Indeed, the importance of all four dimensions was evident in these three sites. 
Commitment and leadership was critical for launching the incident reviews; for enlisting 
the participation of key people, units, and agencies; and for sustaining participation over time.  In 
all three sites there were vacillations in participation but clear evidence that when key 
organizational leaders placed a priority on gun violence, problem solving, and the importance of 
the reviews, that the participation, preparation, sharing of information, and quality of information 
coming from the incident reviews was significantly enhanced. Similarly, all three sites 
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experienced times when such commitment was not apparent and the reviews yielded more 
limited benefits. 
The importance of the partnerships was also critical. As noted above, this involved 
people and the establishment of trust to share information openly in the inter-organizational 
context of the reviews. Partnerships were also affected by the commitment and leadership 
dimension as it was critical to have the right people from the partnering units and agencies 
bringing and sharing information. 
McGarrell and Hipple (2014) posit that a core dimension of effective implementation of 
problem solving is the quality and access of data to support meaningful problem analysis. The 
incident reviews represented a concrete technique for expanding the ability to analyze gun crime. 
All four jurisdictions engaged in new efforts to collect information about NFS with the three 
jurisdictions implementing incident reviews seeking to add to the basic picture of gun violence 
found in police incident reports by tapping into street level intelligence and multiple agency 
sources of information about the people, groups, places, and contexts driving gun crime. 
One of the additional challenges of implementation mentioned by McGarrell and Hipple 
(2014), particularly when implementation is dependent on multiple units within an organization 
as well as inter-organizational partnerships, is the development of effective communication and 
training mechanisms. This related particularly to the ‘people’ challenges described earlier. 
Specifically, there was a need to create shared understanding of the purpose of the incident 
reviews, the dependency on preparation and participation by various actors involved in the 
reviews, and for sustaining this shared understanding in light of inevitable turnover.     
In addition to continued study of these implementation dimensions, several additional 
research questions arose in this study. Whereas three of the four jurisdictions implemented crime 
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incident reviews, each did so differently, tailoring them to their local context. This was reflected 
in the variations across the three jurisdictions on focal crimes (NFS, GH, all gun crime), 
geographic scope, all incidents versus select incidents, and similar elements. Although various 
advantages and disadvantages were apparent to the researchers (see Table 4), future research 
should address the trade-offs from the perspective of the participating agencies and the personnel 
involved in the reviews.   
Moreover, a future goal of this research is to contrast the potential benefits of increased 
knowledge of patterns of gun violence yielded by incident reviews, weighing the concomitant 
costs and time requirements of this program, with data generated through existing information 
systems.  Thus, St. Louis serves as a quasi-control site in the current analysis. From a theoretical 
perspective, the goal is to better understand if and how incident reviews offer unique insights 
into patterns of gun violence when compared to analyses of traditional police records 
management system.  From a practical perspective, we hope to learn if the reviews generate 
tactical and strategic understanding of gun violence that can shape violence prevention and 
control strategies.  
As noted at the beginning of this article, this project was funded by a grant from the 
National Institute of Justice. And, while all three sites implementing the reviews had initiated the 
reviews prior to the actual project period, grant funding supplemented the review process, made 
detailed data collection possible at all four sites, as well as funded research team involvement. It 
is impossible to ignore the role external funding plays in the development of multi-agency efforts 
like crime incident reviews and more broadly, police practitioner researcher partnerships (see, for 
example, Bales et al. 2014, Grieco, Vovak, and Lum 2014, Rojek, Smith, and Alpert 2012). This 
is not to say that incident reviews cannot be implemented without external or additional funding, 
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rather, it makes it all the more important that the necessary organizational elements are in place 
for successful implementation and long-term sustainability (McGarrell and Hipple 2014). 
Lastly, there is always the issue of sustainability of the data collection and review 
processes. Milwaukee has sustained the review process since inception in 2006. Detroit and 
Indianapolis have had periods of time with and without reviews occurring. St. Louis is still 
exploring the review process. The people, systems, and resources challenges presented here are 
both micro- and macro-level organizational issues that will most likely wax and wane over time 
and create difficulties not just for the review process itself but for overall sustainability. 
Maintaining support “at the top” through political and departmental turnover is essential to 
sustainability. While the review process may continue during periods of less support, sites may 
not necessarily get what they need in terms of people, systems, and other resources. The need for 
financial support cannot be ignored. Sustainability discussions must include enhanced data 
collection methods and their automation which are expensive but must be weighed against 
declining resources to support sworn personnel. Both experienced sites and sites new to crime 
incident reviews must be vigilant and proactive in anticipating and responding to challenges 
related to sustainability. 
Conclusion 
 
This research suggests the promise of gun crime incident reviews for supporting problem solving 
approaches to address the serious issue of gun violence. The expansion of incident reviews 
beyond homicides to include NFS, and in the case of Detroit additional gun crimes, significantly 
adds to the picture of gun violence and increases opportunities to identify the patterns of people, 
groups, places, and contexts driving gun violence in each of the cities. This contributes to the 
basic understanding of gun violence within each city and across cities, provides a strategic 
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analysis to inform evidence-based prevention and control strategies, and offers tactical 
understanding for timely prevention and enforcement. Fulfilling the promise of the incident 
reviews, however, requires internal organizational and cross-agency inter-organizational 
collaboration to align people, systems, and resources with this proactive, problem-solving model.  
 Additionally, effectively implementing these organizational and inter-organizational 
changes appears dependent on commitment and leadership, collaboration and partnerships, data 
quality and availability, and training and communication within and across organizational 
boundaries.  Continued attention to these organizational, inter-organizational, and 
implementation dimensions appears as important to the integration of incident reviews in 
strategic problem solving initiatives as is the substantive understanding of gun crime that 
emerges from the reviews themselves.      
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Table 1. Violent crime and homicides in project sites 
 
 
Detroit Indianapolis Milwaukee St. Louis 
National  
Average MSA
2014 Violent Crime  
 Total 13,616 10,768 8,864 5,348  
 Rate per 100,000 people 1988.6 1254.7 1476.4 1678.7 395.7 
  Rank Order - Cities with more than 250,00 people 6 9 10 22  
  
2014 Homicide  
 Total 298 136 86 159  
 Rate per 100,000 people 43.5 15.8 15.0 49.9 4.7 
 Rank Order - Cities with more than 250,00 people 2 18 20 1  
Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (2015b)
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Table 2. Project site summary 
 
 Detroit Indianapolis Milwaukee St. Louis* 
Crime incident review 
Geographic scope 2 precincts City-wide City-wide City-wide 
Gun homicide 
Data collection City-wide City-wide City-wide City-wide 
Non-fatal shooting 
Data collection  City-wide City-wide City-wide City-wide 
Gun homicide  
Crime incident reviews  Yes No Yes- all homicides - 
Non-fatal shooting 
Crime incident reviews Yes Yes Yes - 
Case selection for reviews All GH and NFS cases 
 occurring in 2 
precincts 
NFS – triage selection GH – all 
NFS – triage 
selection 
- 
Meeting frequency Weekly Monthly GH – Monthly 
NFS – Bi-weekly  - 
Meeting length 90 minutes 2 hours 2 hours - 
Number of cases reviewed 20-25 gun incidents 
3-6 CCW arrests 
Up to 8 NFS Up to 8 Homicides 
NFS – varies - 
Meeting preparation Case summaries  
sent 2 days prior 
Case list sent 1 week prior 
PowerPoint 
GH– PowerPoint - 
Meeting Location Police Department HQ Police district HQ GH – Department 
of Corrections 
NFS – Rotating 
district HQ 
- 
Case presentation Precinct Lieutenant for 
case 
Aggravated 
Assault/Robbery Unit 
Sergeant 
GH- Homicide 
Unit Lieutenant 
NFS – District 
Personnel 
- 
*St. Louis did not intend to implement gun crime incident reviews 
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Table 3. Agency review participation by site 
 
 Detroit Indianapolis Milwaukee
Federal Partners    
 USAO R  R 
 FBI O  R 
 ATF R  R 
 Probation R R R 
     
State Partners    
 State Police R   
 DOC R  R 
 Fusion Center  R O 
     
Local Partners    
 Mayor’s Office R   
 Police Department* R R R 
 Prosecutor’s Office R R R 
 Sheriff’s Office/Jail  O O 
 Probation/Parole R R R 
 Community Corrections R R R 
 Crime Lab  R  
 Nuisance Abatement  R  
 School Police O  R 
     
Research Team R R R 
Civilian Coordinator R  R 
Outreach Coordinator R  R 
     
*Police Department Participants    
 Command-level officers R O O 
 Homicide Unit O R R 
 Aggravated Assault/Robbery Unit  R  
 Street-level/front line officers R R R 
 Gang Unit R R  
 Intelligence Unit R R  
 Juvenile Unit   R  
 Precinct-level special operations R  R 
R = Regular participation 
O = Occasional participation 
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Table 4. Incident review dimensions  
 
DIMENSION Advantages  Disadvantages 
 
Geographic scope 
 Citywide Comprehensive picture  Resource intensive 
 Police district(s) Easier to implement 
(resource-wise); 
Easier to tap into street-level 
knowledge 
 
 
Limited generalizability;  
potential to miss cross-district 
elements 
Crime scope 
 All gun crimes Comprehensive picture; ability 
to observe escalation and 
connections across cases 
 Resource intensive 
 Homicides & NFS Ability to see connections 
across most serious gun 
violence 
 
 
 
May miss patterns to other violent 
crime 
 Homicide only Easier to implement 
(resource-wise) 
 
 
Miss majority of cases involving 
gun injury 
 NFS only Expands focus to all cases 
involving gun injury 
 
 
May miss connections to 
homicides 
Case selection 
 All GH and NFS Opportunity to make 
connections across all cases 
 Time and resource intensive 
 Triage selection Time efficient  May miss cross-case connections 
Meeting frequency 
 Weekly Timely tactical information for 
intervening to prevent gun 
violence 
 Resource intensive; limited 
investigatory information 
 Monthly More detailed information from 
investigations and background 
information gathering 
 
 
 
 
Limits ability for timely tactical 
prevention responses 
Visual Aides 
 PowerPoint  Detail specific; can enhance 
discussion 
 Time and resource intensive 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
